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Their role in 
Latin America's capacity 
to import between 1951 and 1975 
Robert Devlin* 
Since the mid-1960s a radical change has 
come about in international financial 
flows which has placed commercial banks 
at the heart of the process. It is they 
that handled substantial funds deriving 
from the expansion of the Eurocurrency 
market and later recycled a considerable 
portion of the surpluses generated by 
OPEC; and for several reasons, paramount 
among which is the expectation of profit, 
they have channelled a considerable pro-
portion of these resources towards the 
developing countries. The article analyses 
the positive and negative effects of this 
process on the nations in question. On 
the one hand, it has relieved the external 
bottleneck, increased the capacity to 
import, provided incentives to investment 
and economic growth, made it possible to 
weather the oil price crises, and afforded 
freedom from the constraints of official 
loans. But, on the other hand, it has also 
increased dependence upon foreign capi-
tal and debt service requirements, and has 
'commercialized' development financing; 
this last consequence generally implies 
more onerous loans with variable rates of 
interest, shorter terms, less tolerance, 
'commercial' criteria for estimating a 
country's creditworthiness, and interven-
tion of banks in government policy. In 
face of these negative effects, the author 
proposes a series of remedial measures, of 
which the most outstanding is to augment 
the available funds of multilateral finan-
cial institutions with resources from the 
central countries and from OPEC. 
•Staff member, economic Development 
Division, CP.PAL. 
Introduction* 
As can be seen in figure 1, in t h e 
mid -1960s Lat in Amer ica 1 exper ienced 
t h e beg inn ing of a d r a m a t i c rise in i ts 
capac i ty t o i m p o r t foreign goods and 
services.2 If 1965 is used as a base , t h e 
region 's abi l i ty to i m p o r t , before having 
recourse t o c o m p e n s a t o r y f inance, m o r e 
t h a n d o u b l e d in 9 years , r epresen t ing an 
annua l average g r o w t h ra te of 10.5 pe r 
cent in real t e rms . Th is is in sha rp 
*1 should like to express my gratitude to Héctor 
Assael, Andrés Bianchi, David Hoelscher, Carlos Ma-
ssad, John McDermott and Aníbal Pinto for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Their indi-
vidual views do not, however, necessarily coincide 
with those presented in the paper. Also, any errors 
that the paper may contain arc solely the responsibili-
ty of the author. 
1 Comprising Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Pa-
raguay, Peru and Uruguay. Venezuela has been 
excluded because its status as a major oil 
producer has long set it apart from regional 
trends. 
2 The concept of capacity to import used 
here corresponds to CKPAL's traditional 
definition, i.e., the amount of goods and 
services that can be purchased with the annual 
net inflow of foreign exchange resources, 
excluding, however, inflows of resources under 
the heading of compensatory capital. Thus, 
capacity to import can be expressed as 
Z = X + EF where Z is capacity to import, X is 
the purchasing power of exports and EF is the 
net flow of financial resources, exclusive of 
inflows of compensatory capital. For the sake 
of clarification, EF = (AI-AO-Fa) - (CO + Fc) 
+ (N + Fn) + E, where AI represents foreign 
autonomous capital inflows; AO, foreign 
autonomous capital outflows; Fa, factor pay-
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Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: NET CONTRIBUTIONS OF PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS AND 
EXTERNAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1951-1975 
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contrast to earlier years, as capacity grew 
by less than a third during the period 
1951-1965, or at an annual average rate 
of only 1.7 per cent. 
It is clear from the figure that the 
major thrust behind the expansion of 
capacity to import was an unprecedent-
ed increase in the purchasing power of 
the region's exports, which came about 
largely because of an unusually prolong-
ed period of favourable trade prices. But 
the figure also makes it evident that the 
rise was attributable in part to an unu-
sually large net inflow of external finan-
cial resources. It is to the analysis of the 
latter phenomenon that this paper will 
be devoted.3 
The format of the paper is as fo-
llows. 
The first section will examine the 
evolution of external financial flows over 
the past 25 years and show their impact 
on the region's capacity to import. The 
ments on autonomous capital; CO, outflows of 
foreign compensatory capital; Fc, factor pay-
ments on foreign compensatory capital; N, net 
movement of assets held by residents of Latin 
America; Fn, factor receipts on national assets; 
and E, the net errors and omissions entry of the 
balance of payments. Note: national assets 
include government transactions; thus there is 
an element of double counting in the data. 
3 An analysis of the evolution of exports 
and trade prices and their impact on the 
region's ability to import can be found in 
CEPAL, "The economic and social develop-
ment and external relations of Latin America" 
(E/CEPAL/AC.70/2), Santiago, Chile, February 
16, 1977. 
analysis will focus on two basic sub-
periods, 1951-1965 and 1966-1975, 
because of the rather distinct behaviour 
of key variables in these years. 
Because analysis will show that a 
heavy influx of foreign loan capital was 
the principal determinant of the increase 
in financial flows during 1966-1975, 
section II will be devoted to examining 
the factors underlying the movement of 
loans. It will be seen that much may be 
attributed to structural changes in world 
finance which encouraged banks to pe-
netrate into the field of the external 
finance of developing countries. 
The third and last section deals with 
some of the implications of recent trends 
in external finance. It finds that not only 
has external dependency and debt in-
creased, but that with the recent emer-
gence of banks as the major agents of 
external financing, the nature of the 
debt problem itself has been seriously 
complicated. 
Finally, before going on to the body 
of the paper, the reader should be fore-
warned that most of the statistical analy-
sis will be confined to the region as a 
whole, with little disaggregation or none 
to speak of. Therefore, care should be 
taken to remember that the statements 
discussed may not be equally applicable 
to all countries of the region. Clearly, 
analysis of trends at such a high level of 
aggregation has serious limitations. But 
there nevertheless is some value, however 
small, in looking at events with respect 
to the region as a whole, and it is just 
such a modest contribution that this 
paper proposes to attain. 
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I 
The evolution of external financial flows and their 
impact on the region's ability to purchase foreign 
goods and services, 1951-1975 
A. The general picture 
A glance at the bottom half of figure 
1 will show that during the period 
1951-1965 external financial flows 
behaved in a rather erratic fashion. But 
in spite of short-term fluctuations, it can 
be said that the financial resource flow 
tended to be negative; only in three out 
of the fifteen years (1957, 1960, 1961) 
was a positive financial resource balance 
recorded. Moreover, towards the end of 
the period there was a noticeable enlar-
gement of the negative resource balance, 
as it reached 1.4 billion dollars by 1965. 
The behaviour of external financial 
resources during this period tended to 
exacerbate an already serious external 
bottleneck; not only was the purchasing 
power of the region's exports showing 
sluggish growth (2.1 per cent per 
annum), but significant proportions of 
these resources were generally claimed 
by requirements to cover the deficit in 
the external financial balance. The gra-
vity of the problem is revealed in the 
upper portion of figure 1 by the rather 
large gaps between the purchasing power 
of exports and the capacity to import; 
indeed, at the close of the period the 
capacity to import was fully 13 per cent 
less than the purchasing power of ex-
ports. 
4 In this section all data are deflated into 
dollars at 1970 prices. 
Faced with this situation, Latin 
America resorted heavily to compensa-
tory finance in order to keep imports at 
acceptable levels. As seen in figure 2, 
there was active use of compensatory 
instruments in every year during the 
period 1951-1965, and this helped to 
support purchases of foreign goods and 
services for amounts in excess of the 
capacity generated by autonomous re-
source flows. But even so, actual imports 
grew by only 2.5 per cent per annum in 
real terms and the coefficient of imports 
to GDP showed a marked downward 
trend over the period.5 
In the second half of the 1960s the 
flow of financial resources started to 
show a remarkable change in behaviour 
(see again figure 1). Over 1966-1967 the 
negative financial balance began to decli-
ne from the peak level of 1965. Then, in 
1968 a positive balance of 0.4 billion 
dollars was recorded, causing capacity to 
import to exceed resources made availa-
ble from exports for the first time in 7 
years. From then on the positive finan-
cial balance underwent strong expansion, 
reaching a peak of 3.9 billion dollars in 
1974. 
As can be seen, the shift to a large 
and sustained positive financial resource 
cent 
5 The coefficient declined from 16.8 per 
in 1950-1952 to 10.9 per cent in 
1964-1966 (including Venezuela). See CEPAL, 
op. cit., p. 47. 
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Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: CAPACITY TO IMPORT, ACTUAL IMPORTS AND 
GROSS USE OF COMPENSATORY FINANCE, 1951-1975 
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.balance caused the capacity to import 
increasingly to exceed export earnings. 
By 1974, capacity exceeded export earn-
ings by 20 per cent; this figure even rose 
slightly higher in 1975 because the fall in 
the financial balance (5 per cent) was 
less than the drop in the purchasing 
power of exports (9 per cent). 
It can also be observed that the posi-
tive external resource balances after 
1967 helped to push the capacity to 
import to levels that were for the first 
time in excess of actual imports. Figure 
2 shows that while actual imports ex-
panded rapidly (8.8 per cent per annum 
in real terms), the capacity to import 
exceeded the imports effected in every 
year except 1971 and 1974-1975, there-
by indicating a substantial accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves. 
Figure 3 breaks down the external 
financial resource balance into its basic 
components: foreign resources, the net 
movement abroad of national assets and 
the errors and omissions entry of the 
balance of payments (the two last being 
designated as "Other" in the figure6). 
The figure reveals that the sustained po-
sitive financial balances that were record-
ed from the start of the late 1960s were 
due principally to the movement of fo-
reign financial resources. 
During 1951-1965 the foreign finan-
cial balance displayed a mixed beha-
viour. At the beginning of the period it 
was negative, modestly positive at the 
middle of the period, and then negative 
again at the end. However, in the latter 
half of the 1960s there was a profound 
change in trends. In 1966-1967 the nega-
6 The errors and omissions entry has been 
included in the financial data since it is thought 
to be more reflective of unregistered flows of 
factor income and capital than of movements 
of tradeable goods. 
tive balances diminished. By 1968 the 
balance had once again turned positive, 
and at 0.5 billion dollars was larger than 
any previous positive resource flow. But, 
more importantly, thereafter the positive 
financial balance grew very rapidly —at 
an extraordinary average pace of nearly 
50 per cent per annum- reaching 5.5 
billion dollars by 1974. In 1975 the posi-
tive foreign balance declined by 20 per 
cent, but nevertheless remained very 
large vis-a-vis historical experience. 
The rise in the positive balance was 
generally less in the case of total finan-
cial resources than in that of the foreign 
component because of the tendency for 
negative balances to be recorded under 
"Other" financial resources. As can be 
seen in the figure, the negative balance 
was exceptionally large in 1973-1974, 
exceeding 1.5 billion dollars in both 
years. The reason behind this big deficit 
will be examined shortly. 
The radical change in the behaviour 
of external financial resources can 
perhaps be better appreciated if averaged 
data for 1951-1965 and 1966-1975 are 
compared. Table 1 presents just such a 
comparison. 
It can be seen that during the first 
period the region experienced an average 
negative balance for financial resources 
in the order of 0.4 billion dollars per 
annum, which is equivalent to 5 per cent 
of the average purchasing power of ex-
ports for the same period. This contrasts 
sharply with the behaviour pattern fo-
llowed over the succeeding 10 years, as 
the average balance of financial resources 
showed a surplus of 1.6 billion dollars, 
representing an increase in absolute 
terms of 2.0 billion dollars with respect 
to 1951-1965, and implying that nearly 
one-quarter of the increase in average 
capacity to import between the two pe-
riods was attributable to the more favou-
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Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL FINANCIAL RESOURCE BALANCE, 1951-1975 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: NET CONTRIBUTIONS OF EXPORTS AND FINANCIAL 
FLOWS TO THE CAPACITY TO IMPORT 

























































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official statistics. 
includes private transfers. 
^Net effect of direct foreign investment (net) less profit remittances; short- and long-term non-compensatory 
loans less amortization and interest payments; net official transfers and amortization of obligations stemming from 
compensatory financing operations. 
rabie behaviour of financial resources. 
Significantly, most of the increase 
occurred after 1970, the average balance 
being 3.0 billion dollars in 1971-1975, 
compared to only 0.2 billion dollars in 
1966-1970. 
This turnaround in the average finan-
cial resource balance was due, of course, 
to the behaviour of the foreign com-
ponent noted above. Whereas the net 
balance on average was a negative 0.2 
billion dollars in 1951-1965 (equivalent 
to roughly 2 per cent of the average 
purchasing power of exports), it rose to 
a positive figure of 2.2 billion dollars in 
1966-1975, which signified an absolute 
increase of 2.4 billion dollars. Most of 
the influx took place in the latter half of 
the period, as reflected in the fact that 
the positive balance averaged 3.9 billion 
in 1971-1975, while in 1966-1970 finan-
cial flows behaved in such a way that the 
average was a rather modest 0.3 billion 
dollars (see again table 1). 
With regard to "Other" financial re-
sources, average balances were negative 
in both periods because annual dificits 
generally resulted from the movement of 
national funds combined with the errors 
and omissions entry of the balance of 
payments. However, the outflow in 
1966-1975 was triple that experienced in 
the previous 15-year period. 
The factor underlying the increased 
deficit was a notably higher negative ba-
lance with regard to national funds: the 
average rose fivefold, from 0.1 billion 
dollars in 1951-1965, to 0.5 billion dol-
lars in 1966-1975. The increase, howe-
ver, largely reflected events in the years 
1972-1974, when the deficit averaged 
1.3 billion dollars per annum; moreover, 
more than three-fourths of the latter fi-
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gure was concentrated in Panama, which 
is an international banking centre. 
To summarize up to this point, the 
behaviour of financial flows differed 
greatly in the two basic periods under 
consideration here. During 1951 to 1965 
there was a significant negative balance 
of external funds, which, when coupled 
with a rather sluggish growth of the pur-
chasing power of exports, formed a 
severe external bottleneck. Even with 
considerable recourse to compensatory 
capital, imports increased at a very slow 
pace in real terms. In contrast, the 
period 1966-1975 was marked by a shift 
to a large positive external financial ba-
lance for the region, and this convenien-
tly coincided with a similarly sharp ex-
pansion of the purchasing power of ex-
ports. The result was a phenomenal rise 
in capacity to import; indeed, capacity 
increased to such an extent that it often 
exceeded actual imports, thereby facili-
tating an accumulation of foreign ex-
change reserves. The key factor behind 
the favourable shift in the behaviour of 
external financial resources was the mo-
vement of foreign funds, which entered 
the region on a net basis in unprecedent-
ed proportions as from 1968. 
Given that the foreign financial com-
ponent played such a vital role in the rise 
in the capacity to import during 
1966-1975, it is useful to examine these 
flows in greater detail. 
B. The foreign financial 
resource component 
Before proceeding with the analysis 
of the behaviour of the various types of 
foreign resources, it will be wise to 
clarify just what is meant by the net 
contribution of foreign finance to the 
capacity to import. 
Foreign financial flows can be said to 
have a direct and an indirect impact on 
the region's capacity to import. The di-
rect impact refers to the accounting of 
resource flows, i.e., the degree to which 
annual inflows of new foreign funds 
exceed outflows stemming from service 
payments (income remittances, interest 
and amortization payments, etc.). 
The indirect impact of foreign flows 
consists in any favourable effects that 
resources may have on a country's abi-
lity to generate foreign exchange: for 
example, new foreign investment in an 
export industry would tend to boost 
export earnings. This paper will deal 
only with the direct effects of foreign 
flows on capacity to import. As will be 
seen shortly, from this viewpoint some 
types of foreign funds have at times had 
a negative impact on capacity to import. 
However, reference to a negative net 
resource balance does not mean to imply 
that these funds have been necessarily 
detrimental to the region's interests; 
only an analysis with a more ample pers-
pective could determine this point. 
1. Direct foreign investment 
Direct foreign investment includes 
capital contributions to private direct in-
vestment enterprises of non-residents 
and reinvested earnings from these in-
vestments. But direct foreign investment 
carries with it a reverse flow in the form 
of income remittances. It is the net ba-
lance of these two flows that determines 
the direct impact on the region's capaci-
ty to import. 
Figure 4 presents the evolution of 
new investment flows to the region and 
the outflows stemming from payments 
of foreign income. It is clear that there 
was generally a large deficit associated 
with foreign investment operations 
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Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA: NET DIRECT CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECT FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT TO CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1951-1975 
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viewed in the aggregate. During 
1951-1965 the resource flow was positi-
ve for only 2 years, 1957 and 1959, 
while in 1966-1975 positive balances 
were recorded only in 1973-1974. The 
tendency towards a negative resource 
flow had the general direct effect of 
reducing the region's capacity to im-
port.7 
A notable feature is that in the late 
1960s direct foreign investment flows 
began to show a new dynamism as com-
pared to the rather flat growth of earlier 
years. However, income remittances also 
underwent a marked expansion, and on 
average the negative balance for foreign 
investment operations doubled between 
the two basic periods (see table 2). But it 
should be noticed that most of the in-
creased deficit was accumulated during 
1966-1970, when the negative balance 
a verag e d 0.5 billion dollars. In 
1971-1975 the gap narrowed conside-
rably and on average the resource flows 
were in rough balance. It can be said, 
then, that while not making a positive 
direct contribution to the capacity to 
import, the relative balance between 
investment and remittances nevertheless 
effectively helped to accentuate the 
sharp rise in capacity to import in the 
early 1970s. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: NET FOREIGN FINANCIAL FLOWS 








































































Source: CF.PAL, on the basis of official data. 
aShort-, medium- and long-term loan disbursements less amortization payments. 
^The net balance of official transfers and compensatory capital outflows other than use of reserves. 
2) Short-, medium- and long-term 
loans (including portfolio invest-
ment) 
These resources include funds lent 
by private and official foreign sources to 
Latin American governments and private 
7 It is worth emphasizing that this measure-
ment does not include any other benefits such 
as those derived from exports, tax revenue 
generated from exports, transfer of technology, 
etc. 
enterprises. Short-term loans are un-
derstood to carry a maturity of up to 
one year, while medium- and long-term 
loans are characterized by a more ex-
tended maturity. The net direct impact 
of these funds on capacity to import is 
determined by the balance of net loan 
disbursements (gross disbursements less 
amortization) and interest payments on 
outstanding loan balances. 
Figure 5 shows that during the 25 
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Figure 5 
LATIN AMERICA: NET CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN LOANS 
TO CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1951-1975 
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years under consideration, transactions 
related to foreign borrowing operations 
generally resulted in a positive net re-
source balance for the region; indeed, 
only in three years (1952, 1959 and 
1965) was the net balance negative. 
What is striking, however, is that after 
1967 the net balance on loan operations 
reached unprecedented proportions an' 
was the principal factor behind the 
strong contribution of foreign financial 
resources to the accelerated growth of 
capacity to import. 
The main reason underlying the rise 
in transfers deriving from foreign bo-
rrowing operations was a rapid and re-
markably sustained expansion (average 
growth of roughly 50 per cent per 
annum) in net loan disbursements, as 
loans were contracted at a much faster 
pace than they were repaid. Thus, the 
net disbursement from foreign loan capi-
tal rose from 0.2 billion dollars in 1965 
to a peak of 8.5 billion in 1974. 
Notwithstanding sharply increasing 
interest payments -their average growth 
rate rose from 11.9 per cent in 
1951-1965 to 17.3 per cent in 
1966-1975- the resource transfer clo-
sely paralleled the movement in net dis-
bursements. By 1974 the net balance 
reached 5.6 billion dollars, or more than 
the cumulative net balance for the whole 
of 1951-1965 (5.2 billion dollars). In 
1975 a 10-per cent fall in net disbur-
sements, coupled with a 13-per cent rise 
in interest payments, caused the positive 
balance from loan operations to show a 
decline (21 per cent) for the first time in 
10 years. Nevertheless, at 4.5 billion dol-
lars the positive resource flow remained 
higher than that recorded for any year 
prior to 1974. 
The unprecedented influx of loan ca-
pital after 1965 becomes all the more 
striking when averaged data are examin-
ed. This procedure can also shed, light on 
the relative importance of short- and 
longer-term maturities. 
Returning to table 2, it can be seen 
that the average net contribution of 
loans to the region's capacity to import 
rose from 0.4 billion dollars in 
1951-1965 to 2.6 billion in 1966-1975 
- an increase of over 500 per cent. This 
reflects the fact that average net disbur-
sements of loan capital rose by 3.5 bil-
lion dollars and average interest pay-
ments by 1.3 billion. Both figure 5 and 
table 2 make it clear that it was after 
1970 when the transfer was most signifi-
cant; the average net flow in 1971-1975 
was over 3 times larger than the average 
for the previous 5 years and 10 times lar-
ger than the annual average balance for 
1951-1965. 
it is also notable that the influx of 
loan capital came mostly in the form of 
medium- and long-term funds as oppos-
ed to short-term funds; fully 74 per cent 
of the increase in average disbursements 
between the two basic periods reflected 
loans with a maturity of more than one 
year. This is an important distinction, 
since, all other things being equal, longer 
maturities are more advantageous to de-
velopment strategy because repayment is 
less of a burden on a country's 'cash 
flow'. 
3. Other foreign resources 
This last group of foreign financial 
data incorporates the net effect of offi-
cial transfers and debt service payments 
on compensatory finance operations. 
Although the combined impact of these 
flows on the capacity to import was ne-
gative in both the major periods under 
consideration (see again table 2), the 
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average net outflow declined by 40 per 
cent and this in itself tended to enhance 
capacity to import. 
The reduction for the most part re-
flects the behaviour of amortization pay-
ments on obligations related to compen-
satory finance (since the impact of these 
flows tends to dominate the group). 
During 1951-1965 Latin America's ba-
lance of payments was generally in 
disequilibrium, necessitating relatively 
active use of compensatory loan instru-
ments. This generated a sizeable reverse 
flow because of the need to amortize 
obligations. But after 1965 the inflow of 
The preceding section has shown that a 
major reason behind the dramatic 
growth of Latin America's capacity to 
import after 1967 was an unusually 
sharp rise in net inflows of foreign loan 
capital. This surge of foreign loans was 
largely attributable to the activities of 
international commercial banks. 
Prior to 1965, Latin America tradi-
tionally relied on direct foreign invest-
ment, suppliers' credits and official bilat-
eral and/or multilateral loans for the 
bulk of its external finance. As for 
banks, they played an important, but 
restricted role, generally confining 
themselves to short-term trade finance 
and occasional project loans that carried 
an external guaranty such as that of an 
official export credit agency. However, 
in the late 1960s, some countries —nota-
autonomous capital tended to be suffi-
cient to meet external financing require-
ments, thus permitting Latin America to 
resort less to compensatory finance, 
which in turn resulted in reduced service 
payments. 
It is clear from the analysis in this 
section that there was a radical change in 
the behaviour of financial flows after 
1965 and that it was due basically to a 
heavy influx of foreign loan capital. 
Since loans played such a key role, it will 
be useful to examine the factors under-
lying events. This will be the task of the 
next section of the present paper. 
bly Brazil and Mexico- began to tap 
foreign commercial banks for sums that 
would not have been considered, feasible 
in earlier years. Once more, much of the 
lending was of a medium- to long-term 
nature. By the early 1970s these two 
countries were already heavily reliant on 
private bank finance, and many other 
countries -for example, Peru, Colombia 
and Panama- were able to secure 
sizeable loans from such banks as well. 
Then, with the advent of the oil crisis in 
1974, most countries experienced severe 
external disequilibrium, and it was pri-
vate commercial banks that extended 
most of the funds to cover external defi-
cits. 
But why the change in access to 
bank credit? Evidence suggests that 
some special forces came into play. 
II 
Dynamics behind growth of foreign loans: 
private international bank capital 
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A. Structural transformation 
of banking 
It appears that to a large extent 
Latin America's increased access to bank 
credit was the result of its being caught 
up in the centrifugal forces created by a 
profound structural change in banking. 
Of major importance to the process was 
the expansion of the Eurocurrency mar-
ket, which was first formed in the 
mid-1950s out of dollars generated by 
United States balance-of-payments defi-
cits. The market was largely unregulated 
and proved to be highly profitable to 
banks. Using this market as a spring-
board, in the 1960s many banks at-
tempted to break out of national fron-
tiers and into the international arena, 
where profit growth was much more 
dynamic than at home. American banks 
led the parade, but soon European, Japa-
nese and Canadian banks hopped on the 
bandwagon. 
The unregulated nature of the Eu-
rocurrency market, together with a 
newly-placed emphasis on the growth of 
earnings, caused banks to abandon their 
traditionally conservative posture and 
display unwonted boldness. A major in-
novation in this period was the regular 
extension of longer-term loans. Banks 
had been in the habit of restricting 
themselves largely to shorter-term lend-
ing because of the current nature of their 
•deposit base. But they found that on the 
Eurocurrency market they could regu-
larly "buy" 6-month deposits, and then 
by continuously rolling them over at 
interest-fixing dates, use these deposits 
to fund much longer-term loans, typi-
cally going up to 5 years. 
During most of the 1960s the Eu-
rocurrency market catered primarily to 
the industrialized countries. But as the 
pool of Eurocurrency expanded, and 
more and more banks, attracted by the 
high yields of international lending, en-
tered the market, competition for cus-
tomers became very keen. By the late 
1960s, the forces of competition and the 
desire to maintain the growth of earnings 
were prompting a search for new cus-
tomers in developing areas. 
Latin America (more specifically 
Brazil and Mexico) became a primé can-
didate for loans because of the relatively 
higher level of growth and development 
to be found there. Banks were also at-
tracted by the fact that developing coun-
tries were willing to pay risk premiums 
in excess of 2 per cent over base interest 
rates in order to secure loans. 
In the early 1970s competitive pres-
sures became so hectic that banks 
—many of them new entrants into the 
international scene saw their lending 
spill over into the smaller, less-developed 
countries of the region; countries tradi-
tionally accustomed to obtaining capital 
from official sources thus found the 
Eurocurrency market to be a more than 
willing supplier of funds.8 Indeed, by 
1972 countries had discovered it to be a 
borrower's paradise; not only was there 
easy access to credit, but competition 
caused margins to be drastically reduced 
and maturities to reach unprecedented 
lengths. By way of example, Brazil, 
which was a leading borrower within the 
developing world, found that it could 
regularly secure credits with a 10-15-year 
maturity. As for spreads, they declined 
from 2 1 /4 per cent in 1971 to 1 1/2 per 
cent by mid-1972 and to 3/4-1 per cent 
in 1973. At the same time lending was so 
8 Most lending in absolute terms went to 
countries like Mexico and Brazil, but Argentina, 
Colombia, Peru and smaller countries like 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama were also 
able to secure sizeable loans from the 
Eurocurrency market. 
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voluminous that the country even found 
it necessary to introduce policies to dis-
courage foreign bank loans.9 
With the advent of the oil crisis in 
late 1973, the forces behind lending 
changed somewhat. In consequence of 
the lack of international mechanisms for 
dealing with the oil crisis, OPEC coun-
tries placed more than 50 per cent of 
their surplus receipts in private bank de-
posits. 10 This left international banks 
awash with funds and needing to find an 
outlet for loans. Thus, the so-called 
recycling process began. 
If the euphoria surrounding interna-
tional lending waned a trifle on account 
of the uncertainties associated with the 
oil crisis, it was a series of major bank 
failures - the most publicized being the 
This cautiousness was accompanied 
by a severe hardening of terms. Interest 
rates skyrocketed (6-month deposit rates 
reached over 14 per cent in August 
9 For additional information on Brazil's 
experience with foreign bank loans see the 
study on Brazil in CLIPAL, Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1975. 
1 ° Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 
World Financial Markets, October 20, 1975, 
P. 4. 
Herrstatt bankruptcy of mid-1974- that 
called a halt to the "go-go" expansionary 
phase of banking. The failures gave bank-
ers the jitters, and many of the smaller 
institutions were pushed out of the mar-
ket by "tiering" of money rates and the 
perceived higher risks of international 
lending. Big established banks also be-
came cautious and revaluated their inter-
national portfolios. 
The bankers' uneasiness was reflect-
ed in a radical change in lending behav-
iour. Loans suddenly became more diffi-
cult to secure. As is shown in table 3, the 
volume of lending to Latin America fell 
by more than 50 per cent in the third 
quarter of 1974.11 Lending recovered 
somewhat in the last quarter (probably 
because of roll-over requirements), only 
to go flat again in early 1975. 
1974) and spreads rose to the neighbour-
hood of 1 1/2-1 3/4 per cent. Moreover, 
maturities showed a sharp contraction. 
As can be seen in table 4, in the second 
half of 1974 long-term loans became 
much less plentiful; by the first half of 
1 ' Data in table 3 are for authorizations 
and therefore are not necessarily in conformity 
with the trends for loans indicated in section I, 
which are based on actual disbursements. 
Table 3 
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1975 only 31 per cent of all publicized 
Eurocurrency credits to developing 
countries had a maturity in excess of 6 
years, as against 73 per cent for the 
corresponding period of 1974. 
As 1975 progressed, bankers found 
that they had to relax somewhat their 
restrictive attitude towards lending to 
LDCs. In the first place, demand for 
loans in the industrialized countries was 
slack because of the recession there, so 
banks, still flooded with OPEC receipts, 
were in need of an outlet, and therefore 
had to lend to the only area where 
demand remained strong - the develop-
ing world. Secondly, by that time some 
developing countries -for example, 
Brazil- had become important clients of 
the banks, and if their loans were not 
rolled over, the banks themselves would 
face the possibility of serious losses. 
While banks resumed their lending to 
Latin America, conditions at the close of 
1975 were dramatically different from 
those prevailing in the expansionary peri-
od. Banks remained very cautious about 
lending and tended to favour larger bor-
rowers who had established themselves 
as clients; smaller borrowers in the devel-
oping world were often marginalized. Of 
greater importance was the fact that 
lending terms became even more oner-
ous. Although the London Interbank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR) subsided from the 
high levels of 1974, spreads rose to 2 per 
cent or more and, as seen in table 4, 
longer-term maturities all but disap-
peared from the market. 
B. Other/actors 
The above remarks suggest that the in-
creased access to foreign loan capital af-
ter 1967 was to some extent supply-led, 
reflecting first the forces of a dramatic 
restructuring of the world banking indus-
try, and then later on the financial up-
heaval created by the oil crisis. But there 
were other important factors in play as 
well. 
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The cyclical export boom that was 
experienced by many countries in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s -and is evi-
denced in figure 1 by the rise in the 
purchasing power of Latin America's ex-
ports— made them appear more cred-
itworthy, from the banks' point of view, 
precisely at the time when these institu-
tions were vigorously competing for 
secondary markets in developing areas. 
And there was considerable demand for 
such loans. 
Many governments had found the 
growth of official financing inadequate 
with respect to their ambitions for in-
creased investment and economic 
growth. The Eurocurrency market was 
therefore a welcome source of new fi-
nance. Moreover, conditions were attrac-
tive. In 1971-1973, when Latin Ameri-
ca's borrowing from banks began its real 
take-off, premiums on interest rates were 
declining and the margins between com-
mercial rates and official rates were sig-
nificantly reduced.n And while com-
mercial maturities of 10-15 years were 
shorter than those of 20-30 years usually 
offered by official institutions, some 
compensation was afforded by the avail-
12 The average Eurodollar rate for the 
period 1967-1971 was 7.34 per cent. Brazil and 
Mexico were able to contract spreads hovering 
around 1.1/2 and 1 per cent in 1972 and 
1973, respectively, suggesting a historical rate 
of 8.34-8.84 per cent. The World Bank lending 
rate at the time was 7.25 per cent. {The 
difference between the two rates would have 
ability of credit and the quickness with 
which banks habitually authorized and 
disbursed funds. 
Another factor in the initiation of 
bank loans was the enormous penetra-
tion of transnational corporations into 
the countries of the region (particularly 
Brazil and Mexico). For various reasons, 
including a desire to enhance earnings 
growth and security, these corporations 
often followed an investment strategy 
that minimized equity contributions in 
favour of debt financing. Being inti-
mately associated with private banks, 
transnationals naturally sought to fi-
nance the hard currency costs of their 
expansion with international bank capi-
tal. 
Finally, the oil crisis greatly in-
creased the current-account deficits of 
most countries in the region. In order to 
forestall drastic reductions in economic 
growth and avert socio-political stress, 
they were compelled to borrow. Since 
adequate assistance was not forthcoming 
from official institutions, the countries 
turned to banks. As noted earlier, banks 
had their own vested reasons for wanting 
to respond to this need. 
been somewhat greater for other countries in 
the region.) For short-sighted borrowers, 
Eurodollar credits could have proved extremely 
attractive. In 1972 the Eurodollar rate averaged 
5.46 per cent, and even with a spread as high as 
2.1/2 per cent, the margin over the World Bank 
rate would have been less than 3/4 per cent. 
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III 
Some implications of the enlarged influx of 
foreign financial resources to Latin America 
It is clear from the preceding considera-
tions that the marked increase in flows 
of loan capital from private banks 
brought with it some very tangible bene-
fits. 
First, it initially helped Latin Ameri-
ca to overcome an external bottleneck 
and achieve a very sharp rise in its capac-
ity to import goods and services, which 
in turn stimulated an expansion of in-
vestment and economic growth. Then, 
with the advent of the oil crisis, bank 
capital was of particular benefit in 
helping to insulate the region from the 
full impact of oil-induced deficits, there-
by warding off a jarring adjustment pro-
cess. 
Secondly, while banks had long 
played an important, if restricted, role in 
the finance of developing countries, the 
expansion of their lending activities at 
the beginning of the late 1960s intro-
duced a refreshing plurality into develop-
ment finance. Many countries found that 
they could break out of the straitjacket 
of official finance, which was available 
only in limited quantities and was often 
tied up in an excessive amount of red 
tape and politico-economic condition-
ally. Moreover, in the expansive phase 
of lending to developing countries 
(1971-1973), borrowers even found that 
there was a high degree of independence 
with regard to selection of banks 
because, as noted earlier, these institu-
tions were competing keenly among 
themselves for new customers. 
While bringing many tangible bene-
fits, the increase in bank finance was also 
accompanied by some side-effects that 
have to be viewed with a more wary eye. 
The most notable of these is that with 
the rise in loan finance came a marked 
increase in Latin America's dependency 
on foreign capital. But more impor-
tantly, because banks (which extended 
more than 50 per cent of total foreign 
capital resources in 1975) effectively 
displaced official institutions and direct 
foreign investment as the major agents of 
financing, the nature of the foreign de-
pendency problem underwent radical 
change. This section will examine some 
of the quantitative and qualitative as-
pects of Latin America's dependence on 
foreign finance and then suggest that re-
cent trends have generated some special 
problems for the region. 
A. The extent of 
Latin America's dependence 
on foreign capital 
The quantitative aspect of the depen-
dency problem can be viewed from 
many angles. Here it will be examined in 
terms of import requirements and debt 
service obligations. 
1. Foreign capital in relation to imports 
Figure 6 presents the annual level of 
a coefficient relating net foreign capital 
inflows (including compensatory capital) 
to imports of goods and services over the 
periods 1951-1965 and 1966-1975. It 
also uses horizontal lines to indicate the 
average level of the coefficient for the 
basic periods considered in this paper. 
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Figure 6 
LATIN AMERICA: NET FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOWS/IMPORTS OF 
GOODS AND SERVICES, 1951-1975 
(Coefficient) 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data 
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As can be seen, the coefficient 
showed considerable variations during 
1951-1965, but averaged 16 per cent for 
the period. After 1965 it climbed 
sharply and relatively steadily, indicating 
a much greater reliance on foreign capi-
tal flows to sustain the region's imports 
of goods and services. Notwithstanding a 
brief pause in 1968-1970, the coefficient 
rose from 8 per cent in 1965 to 28 per 
cent in 1971. Then in 1972 it shot up to 
such an extent that fully 41 per cent of 
the region's imports were underpinned 
by foreign capital. The coefficient re-
mained above 40 cent for the rest of the 
period. 
What the above trend clearly shows 
is that during 1965-1975 Latin America 
dramatically increased its reliance on 
foreign resources for maintenance of 
imports. Not surprisingly, this depen-
dence has also been reflected in much 
higher requirements for debt service. 
2. Debt service requirements 
While it is not the purpose of this 
paper to enter into detailed study of 
Latin America's debt per se, 13 it is nev-
ertheless worth while to review briefly 
the region's debt service requirements in 
respect of foreign capital, because this 
will help to give a clearer idea of the 
extent to which the region is reliant on 
external resources. The first step is to 
define just what is meant here by debt 
service on capital. 
In its broadest sense debt service 
could include remittances of foreign in-
vestment income as well as amortization 
and net interest payments on outstand-
1 3 For a good survey of the debt situation, 
see Carlos Massad and Roberto Zahler, "Dos 
estudios sobre endeudamiento externo", Cua-
dernos de la Ch'PAL, Santiago, Chile, 1977. 
ing foreign loans. But it is more custom-
ary when reviewing the burden of service 
to apply a narrower concept that in-
volves only payments on loans. 
Loans display characteristics that 
clearly place them in the category, of 
debt. When they are secured, the 
borrower is under a contractual obliga-
tion to repay the loan in a specified 
period. This usually involves a precise 
repayment schedule —often based on 
semi-annual or annual installments— that 
the borrower agrees to meet. Tradi-
tionally, repayment schedules are consid-
ered binding and foreign creditors usua-
lly take a dim view of attempts to modi-
fy them; indeed, failure to meet install-
ments, or even indications that difficulty 
is being encountered, can jeopardize a 
country's creditworthiness and make it 
difficult to secure new loans and other 
finance. Thus, if a country is undergoing 
a foreign exchange crisis, and cannot roll 
over debt payments with new debt, it 
must compress imports or face the rather 
traumatic consequences of default 
and/or rescheduling. 
Remittances of profits on direct 
foreign investment, on the other hand, 
do not display the binding characteristics 
of loans. Remittances are determined by 
earnings on investments and thus cannot 
be governed by a predetermined and 
fixed schedule. Although controls on 
remittances are generally frowned upon 
by industrialized countries, and can even 
provoke retaliation, it appears that lati-
tude exists for governments to alter the 
outflow of remittances on any given 
level of investment. For instance, govern-
ments can introduce incentives for 
foreign companies to reinvest their 
earnings in the country instead of remit-
ting them abroad. In the event of a 
short-term foreign exchange crisis, a gov-
ernment can often successfully exert 
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Figure 7 
LATIN AMERICA: DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS, 1951-1975 
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"moral suasion" to induce foreign enter-
prises to delay or restrict their remit-
tances; and in extreme cases govern-
ments have sometimes been able to 
introduce legal measures to restrict pay-
ments temporarily without doing irrepa-
rable damage to the so-called 'foreign 
investment climate'.14 
It is the greater degree of flexibility 
associated with foreign investment in-
come that will cause it to be excluded 
from consideration of debt service. Re-
mittances do, however, represent a 
charge against export earnings and re-
duce resources available for debt service. 
As will be seen, this factor will be taken 
into account when considering the 
burden of such payments. 
(a) Payments 
Figure 7 displays the evolution of 
the region's debt service payments in 
dollars at current prices. Reflecting the 
increase in recourse to foreign loans, 
service payments follow an almost unin-
terrupted path of expansion during the 
25-year period under review. The average 
nominal rate of growth is roughly 14 per 
cent per annum for both 1951-1965 and 
1966-1975. There is, however, a notice-
able acceleration of growth after 1969. 
The region's debt payments rose from 
2.9 billion dollars in 1969 to 9.5 billion 
dollars in 1975; in other words, they 
more than tripled in 6 years, repre-
senting an average growth rate of nearly 
22 per cent per annum in current terms. 
This sharp growth of payments re-
flects the increase in the level of 
borrowing that began to take place in 
14 It should be noted that controls are not 
always completely effective because foreign 
corporations can disguise remittances in the 
form of transfer pricing or other accounting 
techniques. 
the late 1960s. Another factor contri-
buting to the expansion of payments was 
the greater recourse to commercial bank 
credit. As Latin America shifted its 
reliance from relatively soft to hard 
commercial loans, interest costs rose and 
maturities shortened accordingly. 
(bj Burden of payments 
The burden of debt service payments 
is determined not so much by their 
absolute magnitude as by their size 
vis-á-vis ability to repay. A traditional 
'rough and ready' measure of the burden 
is the debt service coefficient, which 
relates debt service to export earnings 
net of foreign investment income re-
mitted abroad.15 
Figure 8 presents the evolution of 
the region's debt service ratio over the 
25-year period under study. It shows 
that from 1951-1957 this ratio remained 
comparatively modest at less than 15 per 
cent. But in the next few years a new 
plateau was reached: by 1961 the ratio 
exceeded 20 per cent and by 1965 it had 
reached nearly 29 per cent. Thus, Latin 
America already had what could be 
termed a relatively burdensome load of 
15 The ratio is only meant to be indicative 
as by itself it provides an incomplete picture of 
the burden. No single indicator or group of 
indicators can provide adequate information 
about the burden of service payments because 
many of the key components of a debt problem 
are not easily quantifiable. For instance, it is 
often difficult to ascertain at what point 
development objectives are becoming com-
promised by requirements to meet debt service 
obligations. Another crucial element that is 
difficult to assess is creditors' willingness to 
"roll over" payments with new loans. Finally, 
indicators cannot adequately forecast events 
such as a bad harvest, political upheaval, etc., 
which can quickly convert a manageable debt 
service into a severe problem. 
86 CEPAL REVIEW / First half of 1978 
Figure 8 
LATIN AMERICA: DEBT SERVICE RATIO, 1951-1975 
(Coefficient) 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
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debt prior to the massive rise in 
borrowing and service payments that 
occurred in 1966-1975. 
It is interesting that the apparent 
burden of debt service did not change 
dramatically after 1965, even though, as 
noted earlier, payments grew very rapid-
ly; indeed, until 1975, when the ratio 
rose to 32 per cent, the service coeffi-
cient actually remained below that re-
corded in 1965. 
The movement of the debt service 
ratio was relatively restrained despite 
sharply accelerating payments, largely 
because export earnings were expanding 
as fast as debt payment obligations, or 
even faster. The year 1975 witnessed an 
abrupt change in trends, however, as 
export earnings stagnated because of the 
recession in the centre countries, while 
payments rose very sharply (33 per cent) 
because of the inevitable reverse flow on 
a rapidly growing mountain of debt. 
With roughly a third of the region's 
export earnings claimed by debt service, 
and prospects of a continued need for 
heavy borrowing, it is not surprising that 
1975 was marked by the beginning of a 
heated controversy in both the North 
and the South about the debt problem 
of developing countries. 
The magnitude of the debt problem, 
and how it relates to the dependency 
issue, can perhaps be better appreciated 
if trends are viewed from another, less 
traditional angle, i.e., that of the manner 
in which debt payments are really ef-
fected. 
In order to repay debt, Latin Ameri-
ca has had to generate sufficient 
amounts of foreign exchange. The princi-
pal sources of foreign exchange, ex-
clusive of new loans, are exports, direct 
foreign investment and transfers (private 
and official). However, in order to deter-
mine the real availability of this foreign 
exchange, net balances must be ac-
counted for, that is, exports less imports, 
foreign investment less remittances, and 
transfers net of similar flows going 
abroad. 
Table 5 presents the current annual 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: NET FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS, 
EXCLUSIVE OF NEW LOANS 
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values of the region's trade balance, net 
foreign investment flows, and net trans-
fers for 1966-1975, the period in which 
foreign borrowing operations showed a 
marked acceleration. It is seen that when 
the net flows are taken together there 
was a deficit on the resource flow in 
every year.16 In other words, foreign 
exchange income consistently fell short 
of general payment obligations, not to 
mention obligations stemming from debt 
service. 
If there was a chronic shortfall of 
income, how then, it may be asked, did 
Latin America manage to meet its debt 
service obligations? The answer is that 
repayment was effected by securing new 
loans to cover interest and amortization 
obligations falling due on older loans, 
i.e., by a roll-over. Indeed, during the 
period under consideration, Latin Ameri-
ca secured loans in quantities sufficient 
not only to roll over debt payments, but 
also to cover the deficit on general 
payments noted above and to accumu-
late foreign exchange reserves. The latter 
phenomenon would lead one to con-
clude that the remarkable accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves after 1966 
(see table 6) was generated not by 
surplus real income, but by foreign 
borrowing. 
" Table 6 
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The practice of paying off old loans 
with new ones is not uncommon in 
development or in commercial finance; 
indeed, few countries would probably 
actually want to repay their debt. How-
ever, the success of a roll-over policy is 
highly dependent on the willingness of 
creditors to respond. Furthermore, as 
interest is effectively capitalized, the 
amount creditors must consider for roll-
over increases each year, with the pace 
of the spiral accelerating as interest rates 
rise and maturities shorten. 
*6 The negative resource flow is even larger 
when the net impact of errors and omissions, 
national assets, and SDR allocations is taken 
into account. 
Many countries in Latin America are 
now largely dependent on banks for 
their roll-over operations. This appears 
to have made the region more vulnera-
ble, because, as will be seen, the "com-
mercialization" of external development 
finance has introduced some new and 
serious complications into debt manage-
ment and development policy. 
H. Banks and the question of 
vulnerability 
Banks have in a fairly short time come to 
dominate the external finance of devel-
oping countries. But their institutional 
and operational framework remains 
EXTERNAL FINANCE AND COMMERCIAL BANKS / Robert Devlin 89 
wholly commercial. This can create com-
plications because a developing country 
that has a disproportionate amount of 
finance channelled through banks be-
comes vulnerable to the exigencies of 
commercial finance, which are not 
always consonant with the requirements 
of development. Moreover, under the 
adverse conditions prevailing in the 
world economy today, complications 
deriving from the commercialization of 
development finance can become so 
severe as to threaten the development 
aspirations of the countries concerned. 
The purpose of the following pages is 
To outline some of the characteristics of 
bank finance which are seen either to 
complicate or actually to conflict with 
the goals of development. The paper will 
then conclude with some ideas on ways 
in which the pressures generated by 
current trends can be relieved. 
1. Variable interest rates on loans 
With regard to interest paid on offi-
cial finance, rates are usually kept cons-
tant throughout the life of a loan. 
Commercial loans, however, carry vari-
able rates that are adjusted periodically 
(usually every 6 months) to the move-
ment of LIBOR or a similar interbank 
rate. This may seriously complicate debt 
management, as interest charges are 
subject to the vagaries of financial mar-
kets and can rise suddenly without 
warning, as was the case in 1974, when 
uncertainties over the oil crisis, inflation, 
and jitters induced by a series of bank 
failures all caused LIBOR, and therefore 
interest payments, to skyrocket. 
The available data presented in table 
7 show that the London banks' bid rates 
for Eurodollar deposits —which repre-
sent a conservative approximation to 
LIBOR- rose from a monthly average of 
8.3 per cent in the first half of 1973 to 
10.6 per cent in the first half of 1974, 
i.e., increased by 28 per cent. Even more 
telling is the degree of variation that is 
encountered if the low bid of 1973 is 
compared with the high bid of 1974; at 
the beginning of the former year the rate 
was as low as 6.8 per cent, while towards 
Table 7 
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the end of the latter it had climbed as 
high as 14.1 per cent. 
Admittedly, the period referred to 
above was a rather turbulent one in the 
banking industry, and as seen in the 
table, fluctuations smoothed out consid-
erably in 1975-1977. However, the point 
to be made here is that variable rates 
render countries with heavy commercial 
debt more susceptible to the shocks of 
international finance and thereby intro-
duce another element of uncertainty 
into economic management, already 
made difficult by the volatile nature of 
world commodity trade. 
It should be remembered, too, that 
the Eurocurrency market is particularly 
susceptible to shocks and turbulence in 
view of the fact that it operates in a kind 
of regulatory limbo. 
As is by now well known, the Eu-
rocurrency market originally developed 
in a rather ad hoc fashion, in part out of 
attempts of commercial banks to evade 
financial restrictions imposed by national 
governments. Thus, the market operates 
in a free-wheeling environment in which 
banks are able to escape regulations 
—such as reserve requirements- that 
national banking authorities customarily 
feel it prudent to apply in their do-
mestic financial markets. Consequently, 
there is at present little information 
on, or control of, international banking 
operations. 
The lack of control has created 
problems for many countries, as billions 
of dollars have sloshed around world 
markets, often contributing to radical 
fluctuations in the balance of payments, 
exchange rates and domestic liquidity. 
But more importantly, because interna-
tional banking transcends national 
boundaries, there is often no clearly-
established bank of last resort to bolster 
institutions weakened by bad loans or 
investments. This characteristic (which 
might well be the Achilles' heel of the 
international banking system), coupled 
with a high degree of interdependence 
among banks, can cause international 
bankers to become nervous over events 
which would normally be viewed more 
or less calmly at home. This in turn can 
be disruptive to Latin American countries 
dependent on bank finance, since a 
nervous market usually manifests itself 
in rising interest costs, and possibly a 
contraction in the volume and/or the 
maturity structure of new loans. 
2. Hard lending terms 
Generally speaking, the cost of bank 
credit is greater than that of credits 
available from official institutions. Even 
in the realm of commercial rates, devel-
oping countries usually have to agree to 
accept considerably higher spreads than 
are commonly granted to the industrial-
ized countries, on the grounds that 
greater risks are involved. When devel-
oping countries borrow at spreads as 
high as in 1974-1977 (1 1/2-2 per cent 
or more), they lock themselves into a 
rate structure which —given the variable 
nature of interest rates- may involve very 
burdensome payments. Moreover, 
spreads often understate effective costs, 
since recent trends have shown banks 
willing to conceal margins in a labyrinth 
of bankers' fees.17 
17 Given that spreads are supposed to 
correspond to the bankers' perception of risk 
(creditworthiness), countries are often reluctant 
to have unusually large spreads publicized. In 
consideration of this concern, bankers often 
hide margins in the myriad fees that custom-
arily accompany syndication of a loan. 
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It is true that in many cases the cost 
of commercial credit is reasonable when 
viewed in real terms and/or in compari-
son with the cost of domestic credit. 
Moreover, if the rate on the loan remains 
below the marginal return on capital 
-something that may be hard to ensure, 
given variable rates— the higher cost can 
be fully accommodated. 
More serious, however, is the prob-
lem of the rather short maturities asso-
ciated with commercial loans. While offi-
cial institutions commonly offer 20-30 
years on their credits, banks extend 
much shorter maturities; since 1975 they 
have been in the habit of offering a 
maximum of 5-7 years on theirs. Loans 
with such a repayment schedule do not 
seem generally suitable for project fi-
nance, as the number of investments 
with a payout upon maturity would 
appear limited. It is possible, of course, 
for banks to refinance their loans when 
they fall due, but this is clearly an 
unsatisfactory and dangerous method of 
financing long-term capital investment in 
developing countries; it introduces more 
uncertainty and makes a country more 
vulnerable to the changing attitudes of 
bankers and the variable conditions of 
financial markets. 
It has already been mentioned that 
in the earlier part of the decade the 
terms for commercial bank credits could 
prove to be more favourable, as it was 
not uncommon for developing countries 
to attract margins below 1 per cent and 
maturities in the range of 10-15 years. 
What is the likelihood of commercial 
lending terms returning to the levels of 
the early 1970s? This is purely a matter 
of speculation, but it is worth noting 
that there has been considerable resis-
tance on the part of bankers to a 
softening of terms, as it seems that there 
is now a new awareness that internation-
al lending is not immune from the 
allegation of "borrowing short and 
lending long". Indeed, the terms ex-
tended during the expansive period of 
banking may have been a novelty 
stemming from exceptional circum-
stances; evidently bankers will (or 
should) be reluctant to depart radically 
from their restrictive posture, which is 
much more in line with traditionally 
prudent lending practices.18 
3. The short-term horizon of com-
mercial finance 
Banks, as traditional lenders of short-
term commercial finance, naturally had 
an infrastructure geared to these opera-
tions. Their creditworthiness criteria and 
analyses reflected this situation, being 
largely financial, commercial and short-
term in nature. These institutions ad-
justed to the rise in bank lending to 
developing countries by incorporating 
more country analyses into their cred-
itworthiness evaluations, but attention 
was still primarily focused on short-term 
financial criteria such as exports, infla-
tion rates, money supply, reserves levels, 
etc.; minimum emphasis was placed on 
long-term trends and indicators of devel-
opment per se, such as the amount of 
critical poverty in a country, its employ-
ment situation, income distribution, 
mortality and literacy rates, etc. The 
trouble is that under these circumstances 
a country that is heavily reliant on bank 
credit may be encouraged to pursue a 
style of development which maximizes 
indicators of external solvency at the 
expense of important socio-economic 
development objectives. 
18 Richard Cummings, "International 
Credits — Milestones or Millstones", Journal of 
Commercial Bank Lending, January 1975, pp. 
40-52. 
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Another problem associated v/ith the 
banks' short-term and essentially com-
mercial orientation is that they can have 
a rather low threshold with regard to the 
weathering of the debt problems that 
frequently attack developing countries. 
When a country first encounters difficul-
ties, banks normally roll over credits 
because it is in their interest to do so. 
However, in providing finance they natu-
rally want to minimize their risk, with 
the result that they extend new credits 
on a short leash, that is to say with the 
briefest maturity and a high interest rate. 
Thus, instead of accommodating a coun-
try with terms that help to smooth out 
payments and provide extended relief, 
banks generally prefer stopgap financing 
that often provokes the need for further 
tinkering and may even contribute to a 
crisis that makes formal rescheduling 
necessary. (The latter can be somewhat 
traumatic and associated with abrupt 
changes in political and economic pol-
icy.) 
It is important to note that some of 
the sharper edges of the commercial 
orientation of banks may have been 
blunted slightly by recent trends. As 
already noted, since the Herrstatt col-
lapse the banking market has been taken 
over by larger institutions. Some of these 
banks have had the resources and the 
good sense to contract senior personnel 
with extensive experience in develop-
ment issues; this presumably will help to 
sensitize top management to the prob-
lems encountered by developing coun-
tries and the diverse strategies that can 
be employed to overcome them. But 
there is nevertheless a limit to how far 
banks can adapt themselves to the 
longer-term requirements of develop-
ment, inasmuch as they are constrained 
by commercial considerations and the 
laws of prudent banking; after all, a 
bank's primary interests are correctly 
linked to those of its depositors and 
private shareholders. 
4. Bank involvement in government pol-
icy 
One of the consequences of the 
banks' assumption of the major role in 
Latin America's external finance is that 
these institutions have gained enough 
leverage to exert direct influence on the 
formulation of government policy. And 
it is natural for banks to want to exercise 
this leverage, because when they are 
involved in broad-based balance-of-
payments support, as has been the case 
since 1974, it is obvious that public 
policy decisions are a crucial factor in 
repayment, or, more exactly, require-
ments for new lending. In other words, 
balance-of-payments support is generally 
extended on the basis of the goodwill of 
government policy. 
One of the first open expressions of 
intent in this regard appeared in early 
1976, and is to be found in the following 
extract from a publication of a major 
international bank: 
"...It is incumbent on banks to im-
prove further their competence in 
appraising borrowing countries' eco-
nomic and financial policies. The 
Fund (IMF) generally will be in-
volved only in the critical cases 
where the necessity for internal ad-
justment is clearcut. But, in the 
less-than-critical cases, bank credit 
decisions also involve a judgement on 
the way an economy is managed and 
on the prospects for the balance of 
payments. In deciding whether to 
extend credits, and in setting the 
terms and conditions for loans, 
banks can influence the nature and 
timing of borrowing countries' poli-
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cies. This is a heavy responsibility, 
and admittedly, one which is difficult 
to carry out, particularly in the face 
of competitive pressures. However, 
from the viewpoint of the borrower, 
the discipline of the marketplace can 
have an important bearing on 
whether sound economic and fi-
nancial policies are taken on a timely 
basis."19 
The intent expressed on this occa-
sion was quickly acted upon, as wit-
nessed by the widely-reported case of 
Peru. In July 1976 a large loan was 
organized for Peru by a group of big 
international banks on the condition 
that an acceptable stabilization pro-
gramme be adopted. Furthermore, the 
loan was to be disbursed in two tranches, 
with the second tranche made contin-
gent on the performance of the pro-
gramme, which was to be monitored by 
the country's private creditors. 
What appeared to be open involve-
ment in Peruvian public policy generated 
concern in many circles, largely on ac-
count of doubts about whether banks 
were institutionally equipped to cope 
with the highly technical and political 
nature of a stabilization programme. 
Thus, these banks subsequently retreated 
somewhat from their original position on 
direct involvement in government policy. 
Some of them are now suggesting direct 
or indirect collaboration with IMF as an 
alternative way to protect their interests. 
The point to be made here is that as 
long as banks dominate a country's 
development finance they have de facto 
leverage to exert pressure on public 
policy, and if it is not used directly as in 
the case of Peru, they will be tempted to 
19 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of 
New York, World Financial Markets, May 1976, 
p. 9. 
exercise it in a myriad more subtle ways 
that need not be discussed here. (It must 
be remembered that banks have a logical 
desire to protect their depositors and 
private shareholders.) And involvement 
in policy, whether direct or indirect, is 
undesirable by virtue of the fact that 
banks are commercial and not develop-
ment institutions. Not only can their 
short-term commercial orientation be 
prejudicial to the continuity of public 
development programmes, but in the 
exertion of influence on public policy 
the possibilities for conflicts of interest 
obviously loom quite large. 
C. Conclusions 
The preceding discussion has shown that 
the commercialization of external fi-
nance places new uncertainties in the 
path of development and seriously com-
plicates economic management. This in 
itself is cause for concern, although one 
might expect that public officials in 
some of the more advanced developing 
countries like those in Latin America 
could perhaps mobilize their talent and 
imagination to surmount or at least 
neutralize some of the difficulties associ-
ated with dependence on bank finance. 
However, conditions are not normal; 
indeed, the heavy reliance of countries 
on bank finance is in part a symptom of 
the abnormal events that are having to 
be faced by Latin America and the 
developing world. 
As is well known, since the oil crisis 
the international economy has been 
highly unsettled and plagued by stagfla-
tion, high unemployment, grave financial 
imbalances and a severe and prolonged 
recession, in such an adverse external 
environment it is not surprising that even 
the best-managed non-oil developing eco-
nomies are finding themselves taxed by 
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the weight of their commercial obliga-
tions. While countries continue to 
honour these obligations, they do so at 
the cost of disruptions in growth, in 
employment and in overall development 
objectives. Moreover, with little prospect 
of an early straightening-out of the 
world economy, more serious problems 
may develop, as countries are now begin-
ning to feel the impact of the bunching 
of maturities brought on by the contrac-
tion of bank lending terms in 1975. 
These conditions alone would sug-
gest that internationally-sponsored cor-
rective measures are in order if serious 
and ill-afforded setbacks are to be avoi-
ded in the Third World. But the argu-
ment for a bold multilateral approach to 
current difficulties is strengthened if one 
takes it into account that developing 
countries' commercial debt evolved in 
rather haphazard fashion and as the 
result of autonomous forces over which 
borrowers at times had only limited 
control. 
As noted earlier in this paper, the 
initial penetration of banks into external 
finance appeared to be largely supply-
led. In the race for marginal earning, 
banks were extremely eager to extend 
credit, the attitude of the times perhaps 
being best summed up in a remark made 
by one local banker of the region: 
"Foreign bankers wanted to give us 
money before we asked for it. The 
Italians had lira for our dam. The 
French had francs for our steel 
mill."20 
And the offer of loans was accom-
panied by highly attractive terms which 
proved to be unsustainable. Also, in the 
20 See Everett Martin, "Peru's economic 
woes are worrying bankers who aid Third 
World", Wall Street Journal, September 1, 
1977. 
eagerness to expand, the institutional 
machinery for evaluating credits often 
lagged far behind the ability and 
willingness of bankers to lend, with the 
result that sometimes insufficient atten-
tion was given to key issues such as the 
use of credit, facility of maturity trans-
formation, and even the medium-term 
ability of a country to generate foreign 
exchange to service its debt.21 
The excesses of the period were then 
compounded by the oil crisis. Since the 
industrialized countries and OPEC were 
unable to respond with an official multi-
lateral mechanism to handle the re-
cycling of surplus receipts to deficit 
countries, the job fell in ad hoc fashion 
to the banks. These institutions were 
therefore forced to assume a role for 
which they were neither prepared nor 
well-suited. As a result banks lent and 
countries borrowed considerably more 
than they would have considered wise if 
viable alternatives had been made avail-
able to them. Another consequence was 
that the initial plurality that banks gave 
to the development finance scene was 
eroded as they came virtually to control 
access to credit. 
Thus, the justification for interna-
tional action appears to be strong. First, 
a commercialized type of external fi-
nance is not altogether satisfactory for 
the longer-term needs of development. 
21 Perhaps the most glaring example of 
prudence taking a back seat is the much-
publicized case of Zaire. This African country 
has a per capita income of only 140 dollars 
(1973). Yet banks saw fit to lend this relatively 
backward country resources in the neighbour-
hood of 800 million dollars (including 
guaranteed export credits); much of it seeming-
ly on the basis of the euphoria generated by 
cyclically high copper prices. When copper 
prices plummeted, the country found itself 
unable to repay the banks. 
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Secondly, the process of commercializa-
tion itself was haphazard and lacked 
discipline. Thirdly, the present state of 
the international economy is slowly 
sapping the strength of non-oil develop-
ing countries to resist the quantitative 
and qualitative effects of a highly com-
mercialized finance structure. 
What then are the solutions? 
On paper the formula is simple. In 
practice, however, implementation will 
prove difficult because much depends on 
the willingness of the centre countries to 
assume responsibilities which they have 
shown reluctance to accept. OPEC too, 
and the deficit developing countries 
themselves, cannot escape hard deci-
sions. 
One solution that has received much 
attention to date is the need for adjust-
ment by deficit and surplus countries, 
with its consequent reduction of the 
need for bank finance. While this propos-
al has merit, it encounters serious practi-
cal limitations for reasons that are well 
stated by J.A. Kirbyshire, Chief Advisor 
to the Bank of England: 
"To recognise that there is indeed a 
large —and continuing— adjustment 
element in the recent [world] situa-
tion is not necessarily to admit that 
financing has been excessive or that 
more adjustment should have taken 
place. That question calls for very 
difficult judgements, and it is fortu-
nately not my primary concern 
today. I would only say, against the 
present background of high world 
unemployment and rates of infla-
tion, that unless the adjustment can 
be initiated by the countries which 
are externally stronger, it is likely to 
be very costly in terms of world 
economic activity. On the other 
hand, if too much of the adjustment 
is borne by these countries, there is 
an obvious danger of recrudescense 
of inflation. If policies destructive of 
world trade and widespread financial 
disruption are to be avoided, we may 
have to err on the side of more 
financing and slower adjustment 
than might otherwise seem desir-
able."22 
And it can be added to Kirbyshire's 
remarks that the requirements for fi-
nance are likely to remain especially high 
for deficit developing countries because 
their ability to adjust is limited by their 
sheer poverty. 
Given the likelihood of continued 
heavy financing requirements, the first 
and most obvious measure to relieve 
problems is for the centre and OPEC to 
make a determined effort to correct 
once and for all the glaring imbalance in 
the types of finance available to develop 
ing countries. To this end, a sharp 
increase in funding of official institu-
tions, especially of the multilateral type, 
is called for. Funding should be suffi-
cient for these institutions to continue 
to attend to the very poor and at the 
same time provide a better response to 
the financial needs of 'middle-class' de-
veloping countries like those in Latin 
America, which have been marginalized 
from official finance in part because of 
the inability of industrialized nations to 
meet their commitments for internation-
al development assistance (1 per cent of 
GNP). The new 10-billion-dollar IMF 
facility would be a step in the right 
direction, although most observers feel 
that it falls considerably short of 
financing requirements. Moreover, it will 
22 J.A. Kirbyshire, "Should developments 
in the Euro-markets be a source of concern to 
regulatory authorities?", Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 17, no. 1, March 1977, 
p. 43. 
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not be sufficient merely to fund the IMF; 
the capital base of institutions like the 
World Bank, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
Caribbean Development Bank, etc., must 
be greatly expanded so that they can 
provide much-needed long-term in-
vestment funds to developing countries. 
In addition to the funding of more 
official finance, there must also be a 
reversal of recent trends towards pres-
sure on official institutions to commer-
cialize their lending terms.23 While some 
firming of interest rates might be neces-
sary to attract capital, this should be 
counterbalanced by a softening of matu-
rities; indeed, it seems reasonable that 
even middle-class countries should have 
regular access to loans with repayment 
periods of up to 30-40 years in order to 
meet their longer-term investment re-
quirements. 
Furthermore, official institutions 
should be encouraged to streamline their 
operations so that there is less red tape 
and delay in disbursement of their funds. 
With regard to balance-of-payments assis-
tance, institutions should design condi-
tionality so that it is more reasonable 
(especially with regard to the period of 
adjustment) and accommodates develop-
ing countries' legitimate efforts to main-
tain growth and minimize unem-
ployment and socio-economic disloca-
tion. If conditionality and red tape can 
be moderated, developing countries will 
23 In 1976 some industrialized countries 
had put pressure on the World Bank to harden 
its interest rates (even to the extent of charging 
a floating rate) and reduce the accelerated 
growth of lending. Meanwhile, official export 
agencies had been attempting to implement a 
gentleman's agreement to harmonize (read: 
reduce competition) on the terms offered to 
borrowers. 
be less tempted to seek out inappropri-
ate sources of finance. 
With regard to private finance, indus-
trialized countries should take active 
measures to give developing countries 
easier access to their bond markets. To 
the extent that developing countries 
have access to private sources of develop-
ment finance, it is these capital markets 
which are best suited to cover such 
countries' long-term investment needs. 
The increased financing from official 
institutions and capital markets will re-
move pressure from banks, which are 
now showing clear signs of concern 
about the share of developing countries' 
deficits that they are being asked to 
finance.24 The banks, while maintaining 
a high profile in external finance, will 
then be able to withdraw to the area 
where they are best equipped to operate, 
that is, trade financing. 
With a rejuvenation of official fi-
nance and promotion of readier access to 
more suitable sources of private invest-
ment finance, the middle class of the 
developing world would have a proper 
opportunity to select the mix of credit 
flows —from banks, official institutions, 
bonds, suppliers' credits, foreign direct 
investment, e tc . - that is most suitable to 
their needs and level of development. 
In conclusion, it may be said that 
developing countries themselves should 
Opposition has arisen to channelling 
more funds to international organizations on 
the grounds that this would represent a 
"bail-out" for banks. While such an argument 
may be ideologically pleasing to some, it is 
clearly counterproductive to the interests of 
developing countries which are suffering from 
the weight of their external obligations. It is 
also against the interests of the industrialized 
countries, because an overburdened banking 
system can be a source of instability in both 
domestic and international financial markets. 
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also revaluate their development strategy 
of the last 10 years, which has involved 
very heavy recourse to external debt 
finance, in an endeavour to see if similar 
objectives cannot be achieved through 
greater reliance on national resources 
and ingenuity. 
In many commercially indebted 
countries domestic policies have perhaps 
been geared too hard and too long on 
external debt. In some cases there is 
room for improvement in the domestic 
savings effort. In others, monetary and 
exchange rate policies can be adjusted to 
eliminate artificial incentives to borrow 
abroad. A further measure would involve 
continuation of export promotion activi-
ties. And, as some countries in the region 
have found, there may now be new 
opportunities for lowering import re-
quirements through substitution. 
In so far as countries find it neces-
sary to borrow, they should carefully 
monitor loans to ensure that conditions 
for maturity transformation are satisfac-
tory and that the best available terms are 
secured. 
Finally, special attention could be 
given to the investment strategies of 
transnational corporations. As noted 
earlier, there has been a tendency to 
finance expansion with ever-growing 
amounts of debt as opposed to equity 
contributions. Steps should be taken to 
see if subsidiaries of these corporations 
can be encouraged to substitute in-
creased equity contributions from the 
parent firm for some of their foreign 
borrowing. This would have the effect of 
transferring some of the pressures of 
reverse payment flows on foreign private 
investment capital from debt service 
—over which governments have little 
control— to income remittances, which 
are more pliable and can be influenced 
by government policy (notwithstanding 
evasive techniques such as transfer 
pricing). 
